Definition of Tenant
Case Law

Are tenant's children "Tenants" under the law?

Tenant Loses Electricity After Landlord Doesn't Pay Bill

Nelson v. Grays, 531 NW.2d 826 (Michigan) 1995.

QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT: Can Children Collect Separate Damages as 'Tenants'?

FACTS: Grays orally agreed to rent her mobile home to Nelson. Under their agreement, Nelson would pay a security deposit and monthly rent; Grays would pay Nelson's electric bill.

Less than a year after Nelson and her two minor children moved in, their electricity was shut off because Crays did not pay the electric bill. Nelson and her children moved out.

Nelson sued Grays to get her security deposit back. She also sought damages for herself and her children under Michigan's antilockout statute. That statute provided, "any tenant in possession of premises whose possessory interest has been unlawfully interfered with by the owner ... shall be entitled to recover the amount of his actual damages or $200.00, whichever is greater." The statute defined unlawful interference with a possessory interest to include termination or interruption of electric service.

The court found for Nelson, but refused to award her children damages. Nelson appealed and the appellate court affirmed, ruling the children could not independently recover damages under the antilockout statute.

Nelson appealed again, claiming her children were "tenants" protected by the statute.

DECISION: Affirmed.

There was no language in the antilockout statute to suggest the Legislature intended to include lessees' children as tenants, so the lower courts properly found Nelson's children were not entitled to damages.

Since the statute did not specifically define who was a tenant, the court had to determine the Legislature's intended meaning. Looking at definitions in dictionaries and other statutes, the court found that the word "tenant" referred to only those people who paid consideration to a landlord for the right to occupy property. While Nelson had an oral contract with Grays to pay rent in exchange for living in the mobile home, her children did not have such a contract. The children had the right to live in the home simply because of Nelson's contract. Editor's Note: This case was the first to consider whether the term "tenant " in the Michigan antilockout statute referred to all occupants or only to people actually obligated to pay rent.

Also see: Grant v. Detroit Association of Wornen's Clubs, 505 NW.2d 254 (1993).